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fired or retired? a competing risks
analysis of chief executive turnover∗
Ian Gregory-Smith†, Steve Thompson and Peter W. Wright
We apply duration analysis to model the tenure and mode of exit of CEOs from
FTSE 350 companies from 1996-2005, a decade in which corporate governance
reforms have sought to increase the accountability of the CEO to shareholders
and their representatives on the board. We find a greater likelihood of dismissal
in the latter part of the period. However, we also find that the likelihood of
forced departure sharply decreases from the fifth year of a CEO’s tenure. We
find evidence that this is because CEOs who survive beyond year four are able to
entrench themselves in their position.
JEL codes: G30, J60
In a UK public company, whilst the board sets the company’s aims and the broad
strategies for achieving them, the chief executive officer (CEO) is responsible for the
day to day running of the company. Concern has been raised, however, about the ability
of the board to adequately control the actions of the CEO, with the result being that the
CEO may depart from the efficient pursuit of shareholder value maximisation (Jensen
and Meckling 1976, Fama 1980, Shleifer and Vishny 1997). One instrument used to align
the interests of the shareholders and the CEO is the CEO’s remuneration package. The
level of remuneration is often twice as high for the CEO as that of the second highest
∗We would like to thank Sarah Wilson and Guy Callaghan of Manifest Information Services Ltd as
well as participants at the RES Conference 2008, the Center for Financial Studies Summer School and
David Yermack for useful comments.
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paid director (MM & K Ltd 2007) and typically contains large performance-related
elements. A second instrument is the ability of the board of directors to sack the
CEO (Fama and Jensen 1983, Zajac 1990, Lin 1996). Indeed, Fama (1980) argues that
damage to managerial reputation, with the implied threat to future earnings, is the
main constraint on CEO behaviour. The strength of this incentive will be influenced
by the extent to which boards are able to monitor the actions of the CEO and, as with
remuneration, it is typical that the board will proxy the CEO’s ability by a measure of
firm performance. Poorly performing CEO’s should lose their jobs.
There is a perception in the business press that the typical length of service for CEOs
within large UK companies has decreased in recent times1 and, moreover, CEOs are
experiencing shorter tenures due to a greater likelihood of being fired.2 This increased
risk of dismissal in the UK is in turn attributed to the ongoing reform of corporate
governance arrangements that began with the Cadbury (1992) Report and continued in
the review of board effectiveness by Higgs (2003), whose recommendations were included
in the revised version of the Combined Code (2003).3 It has also been suggested that an
increase in shareholder activism and voting levels, as called for by the Hampel (1998)
and Myners (2001, 2004) Reports, have contributed to a more demanding governance
regime. It is argued that institutions have increasingly coordinated their behaviour to
provide a more effective constraint on CEO actions (Leech 2003). Indeed, the ability of
shareholders in the UK to dismiss the board at a company meeting is envied by activists
in the US (Monks and Minow 2004).
Despite this, there is an increasing body of literature that has raised concerns about
whether boards are willing or able to remove under-performing CEOs, even if these can
1See, for instance, ‘The art of the sweetly timed exit’, Financial Times, 19th Aug 2004.
2As opposed to alternative modes of exit such as voluntary retirements.
3Companies listed on the London Stock Exchange are expected to comply with, or explain their
non-compliance with, the Combined Code (2003).
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be identified (Lipton and Lorsch 1992, Jensen 1993). Although boards are traditionally
constituted as guardians of shareholder interests, they are likely to fail in this task if
they have inadequate incentives to avoid the rational attempts by the CEO to capture
or negate their influence. Indeed, boards have been accused of providing inefficient
contracts, that are heavily weighted in favour of the CEO, because of the undue influence
the latter has in the pay-setting process (Bebchuk and Fried (2003, 2004)). Similarly, if
the board gets ‘captured’ by the CEO the latter will become entrenched and difficult,
if not impossible, to dismiss.
The extent to which policy measures are able to impact on the relative power of
the CEO and shareholders is also disputed in the literature (Weisbach 2007). If CEOs
have the capacity to capture the remuneration and dismissals processes, it follows that
efforts to reduce their power relative to the board might also be captured and rendered
ineffective.4
A less ambiguous impact of the reform process in relation to CEO tenure has been
the reduction in contract length and of the notice period in a CEO’s service contract.
Prior to the Cadbury (1992) and Greenbury (1995) Reports, contracts with 3 or even 5
year rolling notice periods were not uncommon. Moreover, contract termination provi-
sions were typically opaque and often resulted in compensation payments that included
forgone annual bonus opportunities, enhanced pension provision and an acceleration
in the vesting of share options (Trade and Industry Select Committee 2003). After
Greenbury, contracts were reduced and termination provisions curtailed to the point
that, under the revised Combined Code (2003), service contracts should provide for no
4For example, the Combined Code relies on the boards themselves to determine the independence
of their non-executive directors. If the board is already captured, then it could classify directors as
independent to satisfy the provision in the Combined Code, even if such an assessment might be
considered dubious.
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more than 12 months’ salary.5 In addition, disclosure was made more transparent and
formalised in the Directors’ Remuneration Report Regulations (Department of Trade
and Industry 2002).
There is empirical evidence that poor performance increases CEO turnover in US
corporations from, inter alia, Coughlan and Schmidt (1985), Dalton and Kesner (1985),
Friedman and Singh (1989), Parrino (1997), Audas, Dobson and Goddard (1999) and
Brickley (2003). The composition of the board of directors, both in terms of its size and
insider-outsider ratio, has also been shown to impact the probability of CEO turnover
(Weisbach 1988, Boeker and Goodstein 1993, Yermack 1996). An interesting finding
in this literature is that CEO replacement decisions may have similar determinants
across different corporate governance regimes. Kaplan (1994) and Kaplan and Minton
(1994) found that CEOs in Japan and Germany, countries whose governance systems
are traditionally characterised as involving long job tenure, were subject to similar
influences to their Anglo-American counterparts.
Whilst such studies are instructive, there are good reasons to suspect that they are
not telling the whole story. For example, it has been suggested that a CEO may use
their control of information and board appointments to entrench themselves during
their tenure, ensuring the board of directors becomes increasingly favourably disposed
towards them (Hermalin and Weisbach 2003). If this is true, then it is likely that the
impact of performance on the probability of CEO exit will vary over time. An alternative
hypothesis, which would also lead to a time varying impact of performance relates to
imperfect monitoring: if the output of a CEO cannot be observed directly and must be
inferred from the firm’s results, then there will be some lag before a CEO is judged to
5Note that, at the median, 12 months’ salary is worth approximately double in real terms in 2005
compared to 1995 (Gregory-Smith 2007). Nevertheless, this still means a substantial reduction in the
total cost of removing a CEO has occurred over this period.
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be under-performing. It is only after this period that a badly performing CEO will be
removed from their position. Finally, as outlined above, it is widely conjectured that
substantial changes to the governance environment in which CEOs have been operating
will have affected exit probabilities.
In this paper we seek to examine these issues using a dataset which is unique in
terms of its detail. It allows us to model the duration of CEO tenure and to ascertain
the varying likelihood of CEO exit using a competing risks framework. This permits us
to test between a number of the competing hypotheses outlined above by deriving the
determinants of competing exit states for appointed CEOs . Section 1 gives an overview
of the data, including a graphical inspection of the hazard rates before a more formal
semi-parametric analysis is presented in Section 2. Section 3 of the paper concludes.
1. Data
The primary information used in this study is supplied by Manifest Information Services
Ltd, corporate governance consultants, who maintain a comprehensive governance and
compensation database for all UK companies that have featured in the FTSE 350 Index
during any financial year between January 1996 and December 2005. A major advantage
of Manifest’s data is that the name of the CEO, together with their appointment and
departure date are identified.6 The period chosen covers a full economic cycle, with
market growth until 2001, subsequent decline and recovery. Moreover, the period under
analysis is particularly interesting given the steady flow of corporate governance reforms
designed to improve the transparency and accountability of boards. Investment trusts
that contained no executive directors are excluded from the sample, although self-
6To avoid survivorship bias as far as possible, companies that drop out of the index prior to 2006
are included in our sample unless the company is no longer publicly quoted.
C5
C6 the economic journal month year
managed investment trusts are retained. Manifest’s data was further supplemented with
other control variables from Thomson Datastream. Summary statistics are provided in
Table 1 below.
Table 1: Sample Description
1996-2000 2001-2005 1996-2005
No. of companies 505 508 590
No. of CEOs 676 759 1179
No. of CEO exits 333 579 912
No. of interim appointments 23 84 107
% of CEOs exiting (excluding interim) 47% 73% 75%
Total Observations 2120 2413 4533
Survival times, years
1st quartile 2.53 2.18 2.33
Median 5.41 4.00 4.34
3rd quartile 10.01 6.51 7.24
Age
1st quartile 46 45 46
Median 51 50 51
3rd quartile 55 55 55
Total Shareholder Return
1st quartile -9.40% -18.00% -13.48%
Median 11.74% 8.35% 10.12%
3rd quartile 33.40% 26.30% 29.60%
%Insiders on board (median)
Company assessment 0.510 0.500 0.500
Sales (median) (2006, £) 563m 573m 570m
Board Size (median) 8 8 8
Over our sample period we observe 1179 CEOs working for 590 companies. Of these,
912 end with the termination of the CEO’s contract. The median survival time for a
CEO is about 41
2
years. Note that, in line with popular perception, the proportion of
CEOs experiencing an exit event is significantly higher in the second period, with the
median survival time being approximately 11
2
years shorter in the second half of the
sample. This increase is shown year on year in figure 1. This decline in average CEO
tenure coincides with a decline in market performance, as measured by total shareholder
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return.7
Fig. 1: CEO exits over time
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Notes: Figure excludes interim appointments and internal position changes.
The table also reflects the institutional changes over the period, with the percentage
of insiders8 falling steadily during the period (Figure 2) and the percentage of non-
executive directors rising.9
There are a number of ways in which a CEO can leave their position, only one of
which is dismissal. We conducted an electronic search of financial news archives and
regulatory news service announcements in order to identify the circumstances under
which the CEO left his/her position and so exited the sample. Information confirming
7Total shareholder return reflects both the capital gain from the movement in the share price and
income from dividends.
8The percentage of insiders is defined as the proportion of the board that consists of executive
directors and affiliated non-executive directors.
9Some concern has been raised in the literature regarding the reliability of company own assessments
(Lin, Pope & Young 2003, Young 2000). To examine whether our results are sensitive to this issue, we
re-estimated the model using Manifest’s assessment of independence, which differs only marginally to
that suggested by Lin et al. (2003). The measured impact of insiders is reduced in significance, but
the results for the other covariates are not qualitatively different from the results given in the paper.
These results are available from the authors on request.
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Fig. 2: Mean board composition
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their departure was found in every case and, in all but 65, some explanation of their
leaving was offered. This allowed us to split the exit events into 9 types, details of which
are given in Table 2.
Note that CEOs are rarely officially ‘dismissed’, with only 10 CEOs suffering this fate
in the 10 years of the sample. In many cases it is suspected that face-saving descriptions
are used, either to avoid further damage to the ousted executive’s reputation or to
facilitate the conclusion of negotiations over compensation. Therefore, care was required
when classifying executive departures by exit state. However, where clear evidence was
found to show that the CEO had been forced out of their position, the CEO was
considered to have been ‘ousted’.
A common occurrence during the sample period was that the roles of Chairman and
Chief Executive were split, consistent with the post-Cadbury recommendation for best
practice. We code these cases separately as ‘internal change’ since they do not appear
to constitute a forced CEO exit. We also code separately those CEO exits arising from
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restructuring or change of control.10 ‘Interim’ appointments to the CEO’s position
generally arise as a consequence of the sudden departure of the previous CEO, when
someone, most often the Chairman, steps in to fill the role of Chief Executive on a
caretaker basis. As these appointments are temporary by definition we exclude them
from our analysis.
In a small number of cases no clear reason was given for the departure of the CEO
and we could find no clear evidence of either an ousting or an immediate appointment to
another company. We put these into an ‘unclassified’ departure category. The absence of
any press rumours of dismissal suggests these cases were not among the more egregious
examples of CEO behaviour, but it is suspected this category includes departures from
a number of causes, including changes of career, moves to private equity companies etc.
Table 2: CEO turnover by mode of exit
1996− 2000 2001− 2005 1996− 2005
Number % Number % Number %
Dismissed 3 0.90 7 1.21 10 1.10
Ousted 41 12.31 84 14.51 125 13.71
Internal Change 28 8.41 28 4.84 56 6.14
Interim Appointment 23 6.91 84 14.51 107 11.73
Retirement 90 27.03 162 27.98 252 27.63
Retired to Part Time 30 9.01 54 9.33 84 9.21
Change of Control 74 22.22 89 15.37 163 17.87
Head-hunted 23 6.91 27 4.66 50 5.48
Unclassified 21 6.31 44 7.60 65 7.13
Total exits 333 100 579 100 912 100
Table 3 breaks down CEO tenure by exit event. The survival times are lowest for
interim appointments, as might be expected, followed by those who are headhunted,
who also tend to be relatively young. Those who are dismissed and ousted have the next
shortest tenure. Those whose positions end with retirement generally have the longest
10Indeed, in some cases the CEO continues as CEO of the new company.
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tenures and are oldest at exit. This illustrates the importance of carefully distinguishing
exit states in any empirical analysis.
Table 3: Tenure by exit event
Survival times Age at exit
Lower Median Upper Median Mean
quartile quartile
Dismissed 2.0 2.4 5.0 52.5 49.06
Ousted 1.9 3.0 4.5 50 50.51
Interim appointment 0.3 0.5 0.8 53 51.05
Retirement 2.5 4.8 7.5 56 54.75
Retired to part-time 2.5 3.6 6.0 56 54.14
Change of control 1.4 2.3 4.4 50 49.25
Headhunted 1.7 2.9 5.1 49 47.96
Unclassified 1.9 3.6 6.3 54 52.13
Note: Survival times allow for left truncation and right censoring.
This table illustrates that existing research on executive tenure is likely to suffer
from two inter-related difficulties: first, CEOs resign for a variety of reasons some of
which (e.g. being headhunted) may be associated with success, some (e.g. dismissal)
with failure and others (e.g. retirement) may have ambiguous performance associations.
This clearly requires any analysis to allow for different determinants for the alternative
exit states. Datasets which do not distinguish between these competing events have
distinct disadvantages to those, such as ours, that can. We now consider how best to
model the duration of CEO tenure.
2. Duration analysis
In modelling the duration of CEO tenure, we will adopt the Cox (1972) proportional
hazard model. A hazard based analysis is useful as our data contains both left truncation
(as some CEOs began their tenure prior to the sample start date) and right censoring
(as some CEOs have not completed their tenure by the end of the sample) both of which
can be readily handled in this framework.
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2.1. Non-parametric analysis
Prior to estimation, we briefly present a graphical analysis of the hazard rate by exit
type. To do so, we combine the possible exit types into three groups: Forced exits
(dismissals and ousted), retirements (including remaining as Chairman) and other exits
(headhunted, change of control and unclassified).11
Fig. 3: Cause specific hazards
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Figure 3 demonstrates the different likelihood of exit to the competing exit states
over the tenure of a CEO. At the start of a CEO’s employment, the least likely reason
for exit is retirement, though this probability steadily increases as time passes. The risk
of being forced out rises steadily in the early years, peaks in the fifth year, and declines
thereafter- eventually becoming the least likely exit state. Hence, once the CEO has
completed 6 years, the most likely form of departure is retirement.
Since one might expect different influences to impact on the hazard rates for forced
exit and retirement, Figure 4 examines the impact of firm performance. We would
11Interim appointments are not regarded as an exit type.
C11
C12 the economic journal month year
expect poor firm performance to have a stronger influence on the hazard of forced
departure than the hazard of retirement. For simplicity, we identify four performance
quartiles determined by the annual total shareholder return (TSR) ranking within the
FTSE 350.
Fig. 4: Breakdown by firm performance
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Figure 4 shows that TSR has an impact on the hazard of forced exit with the di-
vergence between the bottom and top quartile performers increasing until year four
and remaining higher until year 12. With respect to retirements, the lower quartile
performers also have a marginally higher risk of exit up to year 10 or 11, which could
reflect CEOs with disappointing performance retiring early.
To investigate the possibility that CEOs may be less likely to be ousted from ‘cap-
tured’ boards, Figure 5 compares the hazard rates of those CEOs who have an insider
dominated board with those that have independent boards. As can be seen, the haz-
ard for forced exits is consistently lower if a board is dominated by insiders. This is
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suggestive of an entrenchment effect. Although the effect is less obvious, the probabil-
ity of early retirement is also less in dominated boards, also suggesting entrenchment.
Moreover, since the difference in the hazard between the dominated boards and the in-
dependent boards is greatest between years 9 and 12, this is consistent with the notion
that it may take a number of years for a CEO to capture their board.
Fig. 5: Breakdown by board type
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2.2. Semi-parametric analysis
2.2.1. All Exit States
Whilst the graphical analysis is indicative, many additional factors could be impacting
on the probability of CEO exit. We therefore proceed with an econometric analysis.
In standard parametric survival analysis one needs to assume an explicit form for the
C13
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underlying hazard rate, which imposes restrictions on the range of allowable behaviour.
By contrast, the Cox (1972) proportional hazard model is a semi-parametric method
which allows the estimation of the impact of a covariate without restricting the shape
of the baseline hazard. This is convenient for our purposes since we have few priors
concerning the form of the underlying baseline hazard. Under the Cox model, the hazard
rate that the j’th CEO faces is multiplicatively proportional to the baseline hazard,
λ0(t), that all CEOs face, modified by covariates xj (Cleves, Gould and Gutierrez
2002).12
λ(t|xj) = λ0(t) exp(xjβx) (1)
Table 4 shows the results from running a basic Cox proportional hazards model with
all exit states constituting a single failure event.13 The t-statistics indicate whether
the co-variate has a statistically significant impact, as normal. However, for ease of
interpretation, hazard ratios are reported, and thus a coefficient indicates the probability
of exit compared to the baseline. A number greater than one indicates the hazard is
increased, a number less than one indicates that it is decreased.
The null hypothesis of this paper is that poorly performing CEOs should be dis-
missed. In our regressions, the total shareholder return variables identify annual per-
formance quartiles compared to the lower quartile performers in the FTSE 350 Index.
Even with all exit states bundled together, the impact of a low performance ranking is
clear. The probability of exit for low to median performers is 76% that of the worst
performers, whilst those in the upper quartile have a hazard that is only 46% of the
12The Cox model only concerns itself with the ordering of failure times, not the distribution of failure
times. The baseline hazard λ0 is therefore left unestimated.
13The model is estimated in STATA using the stcox command.
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lowest quartile.
The theoretical caveat to our null hypothesis is that the threat of dismissal is miti-
gated if the CEO is able to entrench themselves and capture the board. Table 4 shows
that the insider variables are also important. Increasing the proportion of independent
directors on the board by 20 percentage points, whilst holding the total number of direc-
tors the same, would result in an increase in the hazard rate of approximately 14%. In
addition, CEO’s with larger boards face lower hazard rates, with the results indicating
that losing 4 directors from the board would increase the hazard rate by 33%. Age also
has a positive impact of the probability of exit.14 A 65 year old CEO has double the
hazard rate of a 55 year old.
Boards which comprise a greater proportion of directors appointed during the tenure
of the current CEO result in lower hazard rates.15 The average length of service of the
non-executive directors decreases the hazard, suggesting that a non-executive director
does not become more rigorous at monitoring with experience, but rather the CEO
carries more influence the longer the director serves in office.
The ownership structure of the firm may also be important in determining CEO
turnover. To examine this, we include the difference between the equity holdings of
the largest blockholder and those of the CEO. The results indicate that the higher the
relative holdings of the blockholder, the more likely the CEO is to be forced from their
position.16
14Age is entered as a squared term beginning at age 50.
15In the UK, directors are appointed by the Nomination Committee, a subcommittee of the board,
typically led by the chairman or a non-executive director. However, the CEO or other executive
directors may also sit on this committee. The percentage of the Board appointed by the CEO variable
is constructed by recording the proportion of the board appointed during the tenure of the CEO. This
variable is a proxy for the friendliness of the board towards the CEO on the presumption that the
CEO is unlikely to preside over the appointment of hostile board members.
16A complete analysis of control in a public company requires more detailed knowledge of (at least
the upper tail of) the distribution of voting shares, as in Leech (2001).
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Table 4: Hazard to Any exit
a b
Total shareholder return
Lower quartile-Median 0.764*** (-2.83) 0.530 (-1.13)
Median-Upper quartile 0.612*** (-4.59) 0.432 (-1.37)
Upper quartile 0.458*** (-7.20) 0.367* (-1.85)
Ln Sales 1.092*** (2.99) 1.094*** (2.96)
Age 1.005*** (4.06) 1.005*** (4.08)
Board Size 0.918*** (-4.47) 0.905*** (-3.04)
% Insiders on Board 0.322*** (-3.44) 0.323*** (-3.18)
% Board Appointed by CEO 0.257*** (-6.64) 0.248*** (-5.08)
Ave NED Tenure 0.909*** (-4.87) 0.894*** (-3.44)
Block equity-CEO equity 1.013*** (4.20) 1.013*** (4.08)
Total shareholder return interactions
Board Size
Lower quartile-Median 1.028 (0.66)
Median-Upper quartile 1.010 (0.23)
Upper quartile 1.024 (0.50)
% Insiders on Board
Lower quartile-Median 1.073 (0.12)
Median-Upper quartile 1.076 (0.11)
Upper quartile 0.968 (-0.05)
% Board appointed by CEO
Lower quartile-Median 0.936 (-0.18)
Median-Upper quartile 1.145 (0.32)
Upper quartile 1.081 (0.17)
Ave non-executive tenure
Lower quartile-Median 1.029 (0.62)
Median-Upper quartile 1.031 (0.59)
Upper quartile 1.000 (0.00)
N 3364 3364
No. CEOs 871 871
No. Failures 607 607
Wald (χ2) 252.096(19) 256.561(31)
1. Robust t-statistics, clustered on CEO, are reported in the parentheses.
2. *** Significant at 1%. ** Significant at 5%. * Significant at 10%.
3. Year dummies included.
C16
C17 fired or retired? month year
It is possible that the governance of the company modifies the effect that performance
has on the likelihood of CEO exit. To investigate this, we interact board size, %
insiders, % board appointed by the CEO and average non-executive tenure with the total
shareholder return variables. The results are show in column b of Table 4. None of these
interactions are statistically significant and so the structural measures of entrenchment
described above appear not to diminish the impact of performance on the likelihood of
exit.
2.2.2. Competing risk estimates
By grouping all exit types together, the model presented in Tables 4 implicitly assumes
the same underlying hazard rate across all failure types. However, as we have seen,
there are good reasons to suspect that the baseline hazard is likely to vary depending
on the event from which the CEO is at risk. For example, under an entrenchment
hypothesis, one would expect the hazard of dismissal to reduce over the course of the
CEO’s tenure but the hazard of retirement will increase. One strategy, as used by
Geddes and Vinod (1997), is to exclude observations that experience the competing
event and just analyze the event of primary interest, in this case dismissal. However, a
more efficient and informative approach is to directly compare alternative exit states in
a common framework. We therefore adopt a competing risks methodology (Prentice et
al. (1978), Kalbfleisch and Prentice (1980)). The risks are competing in the sense that
the exit states are mutually exclusive (i.e. upon retirement the CEO can no longer be
dismissed) and thus each event censors each other event. We distinguish between three
competing exit types: forced departures; retirements; and other exits. We follow the
method of Lunn and McNeil (1995) and stratify by risk type, since we do not wish to
restrict the baseline hazards of the different risk types to share a constant ratio. This
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is achieved by duplicating the data so that there are three entries per observation, one
for each risk type. The duplicated entries show the other risk types and are always
censored. If the original observation is right censored, then three entries exist, one for
each failure type, all of which are censored. A Cox regression, stratified by failure type,
is then performed with the covariates interacted with each risk type. By this method
we can identify how the covariates impact upon each competing risk.
Examining the competing risk estimates, a clear distinction can be observed in Table
5 with respect to the influence of covariates upon CEO turnover. Firm performance is
critical in the hazard of a forced exit, with CEOs of firms in the top quartile having
a hazard rate only 20% of that of the bottom quartile. In contrast, performance has
a positive impact on exits to other states, presumably as high performers move on to
other jobs.
Table 5 shows that CEO’s with a larger proportion of the board appointed during
their tenure are at significantly lower risk of dismissal. Ceteris paribus, increasing the
proportion of the board who have been appointed during the tenure of the CEO by
50 percentage points reduces the risk of dismissal by 40%. Boards comprising longer
serving non-executive directors also reduce the risk of dismissal for the CEO.
As with the single risk estimates, we also interact the performance with the gov-
ernance variables, but again these effects are largely insignificant. Therefore, we are
unable to conclude that the impact of poor performance upon dismissals is reduced in
weakly governed firms.
To summarise, we have provided evidence that poorly performing CEOs are at a
greater risk of dismissal. We have also shown that governance matters: CEOs with
larger boards, with more directors appointed during their tenure, with established non-
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Table 5: Hazard to Competing Risks
Forced Departure Retirement Other Forced Departure Retirement Other
Total shareholder return
Lower quartile-Median 0.402*** 2.220** 2.072** 0.246 2.685 4.762
(-3.70) (2.69) (2.34) (-0.90) (0.56) (0.83)
Median-Upper quartile 0.360*** 1.829* 2.034** 0.074* 8.066 10.477
(-4.17) (1.93) (2.21) (-1.70) (1.10) (1.20)
Upper quartile 0.196*** 3.317*** 2.325** 0.103 10.907 2.599
(-5.15) (3.28) (2.18) (-1.19) (1.13) (0.43)
Ln Sales 1.194** 0.933 0.883 1.209** 0.922 0.869
(2.53) (-0.80) (-1.42) (2.60) (-0.91) (-1.55)
Age 0.999 1.008*** 0.998 0.999 1.008*** 0.998
(-0.41) (2.84) (-0.58) (-0.41) (2.78) (-0.52)
Board Size 0.936 0.966 1.003 0.910 0.999 0.987
(-1.42) (-0.60) (0.05) (-1.42) (-0.01) (-0.13)
% Insiders on Board 0.205** 2.252 1.707 0.182** 2.137 2.423
(-2.08) (0.88) (0.54) (-2.16) (0.76) (0.85)
% Board Appointed by CEO 0.196*** 2.260* 0.957 0.147*** 2.946 1.964
(-4.26) (1.72) (-0.10) (-3.77) (1.55) (0.97)
Ave NED Tenure 0.806*** 1.160** 1.150** 0.814** 1.155 1.120
(-3.57) (2.24) (2.00) (-2.38) (1.35) (1.09)
Block equity-CEO equity 1.017** 0.994 0.997 1.017** 0.993 0.996
(2.38) (-0.72) (-0.36) (2.48) (-0.82) (-0.41)
Total shareholder return interactions
Board Size
Lower quartile-Median 0.997 1.045 1.034
(-0.03) (0.37) (0.26)
Median-Upper quartile 1.121 0.829 0.949
(1.29) (-1.49) (-0.42)
Upper quartile 1.023 0.957 1.093
(0.16) (-0.28) (0.53)
% Insiders on Board
Lower quartile-Median 1.643 1.026 0.284
(0.30) (0.01) (-0.59)
Median-Upper quartile 1.130 1.218 0.662
(0.08) (0.10) (-0.21)
Upper quartile 2.096 0.462 0.391
(0.36) (-0.34) (-0.37)
% Board appointed by CEO
Lower quartile-Median 3.278 0.189 0.141*
(1.29) (-1.46) (-1.69)
Median-Upper quartile 0.774 2.572 0.788
(-0.29) (0.81) (-0.20)
Upper quartile 2.982 0.316 0.138
(0.78) (-0.72) (-1.19)
Ave non-executive tenure
Lower quartile-Median 0.878 1.128 1.221
(-0.77) (0.64) (1.05)
Median-Upper quartile 1.152 0.877 0.846
(1.09) (-0.85) (-0.97)
Upper quartile 0.835 1.115 1.262
(-1.20) (0.63) (1.22)
No. CEOs 871 871
No. Failures 607 607
Wald (χ2) 375.810(59) 410.609(95)
Equality of coefficients across risks (χ2) 78.97(20) 104.96(44)***
1. Robust (clustered around CEO) t-statistics reported in the parentheses.
2. *** Significant at 1%. ** Significant at 5%. * Significant at 10%.
3. Year dummies included.
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executive directors and with a greater proportion of insiders have lower hazard rates
of dismissal. Yet, we fail to find evidence of an interaction between performance and
governance.
Performance Revelation vs Entrenchment
In the non-parametric analysis in section 2.1. we showed that the hazard of forced exit
varied over a CEO’s tenure, increasing until year 4 and declining thereafter. This is a
pattern that we might expect to see under entrenchment. The hazard rate will decrease
if the CEO captures the board, which might take the CEO a number of years. Now,
even if shareholders desire to remove the CEO, they will have lower rates of success due
to the increasingly entrenched position of the CEO.
However, Figure 3 also describes what we might expect to see with performance
revelation. As information regarding the CEOs ability increases as a result of observing
additional years of firm performance under their tenure, shareholders may become more
willing to stick with the CEO, even if current performance is relatively poor. However,
if the declining hazard is due to information revelation, we would additionally expect
the impact of cumulative good past performance to make the CEO more secure. To this
end, we additionally add the cumulative change in TSR ranking to our regressions.17
We then allow the impact of the performance and insider variables to vary, by splitting
our sample at 5 years of tenure.18 Table 6 presents the results of this exercise.
Current performance, measured by total shareholder return does indeed appear to
become less important after 5 years, as predicted by both the entrenchment and per-
17The cumulative change in TSR ranking captures performance in all years since appointment,
assuming each year’s performance is equally important.
18We have experimented with break points at other tenures, but that at 5 years gives the model with
the highest log-likelihood.
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formance revelation hypotheses. Our reported estimates also show that the impact of
insiders on the hazard of forced departures increases after the CEO has been in office
for 5 or more years. This is consistent with the entrenchment hypothesis. No evidence
is found for information revelation however- the coefficient on the change in TSR rank-
ing moves in the opposite direction to that expected. This suggests that shareholders
continue to regard recent, rather than good past, performance as the key indicator of
CEO competence.
Governance Environment
As indicated in the introduction, the period of investigation was one of an ongoing pro-
gramme of corporate governance reforms (Cadbury 1992, Greenbury 1995, Combined
Code 1999, 2003, Higgs 2003) which might be expected to have impacted upon execu-
tive tenure: First, as noted above, these changes had the consequence of progressively
reducing the contract length for UK senior executive from three years or more, in the
early 1990s to 12 months or less by 2003 (Combined Code 2003). This would have
had a corresponding impact on the compensation requirements in the event of sever-
ance and hence be expected to reduce the costs of CEO dismissal. Second, the reforms
from Cadbury onwards have consistently sought to strengthen the role and indepen-
dence of non-executive directors (Solomon 2007). If successful, this would be expected
to increase the accountability of CEOs and increase the risk of dismissal for poorer
performers among their number.
Finally, if less obviously, there is a widespread perception that shareholder activism
has increased over the period (Davies, Platts & Lewis 2008). In part, this has been
encouraged by corporate governance reforms which have increased direct shareholder
voice - on such issues as calling shareholder meetings, replacing directors, approving
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Table 6: Performance revelation versus entrenchment
Tenure<5 Tenure≥5
Forced Departure Retirement Other Forced Departure Retirement Other
Total shareholder return
Lower quartile-Median 0.406*** 2.393** 1.464 0.320** 2.868* 2.867*
(-3.06) (1.98) (0.96) (-2.12) (1.83) (1.72)
Median-Upper Quartile 0.359*** 1.432 1.565 0.231** 3.511* 2.536
(-3.17) (0.69) (1.02) (-2.40) (1.90) (1.28)
Upper Quartile 0.148*** 3.269* 2.037 0.186** 3.979* 1.731
(-3.59) (1.64) (1.09) (-2.40) (1.82) (0.64)
Change TSR Ranking 0.943 1.340 1.973 3.055* 0.285* 0.607
(-0.15) (0.51) (1.36) (1.60) (-1.68) (-0.60)
Ln Sales 1.194** 0.905 0.894 1.217** 0.928 0.865
(2.43) (-1.08) (-1.24) (2.05) (-0.72) (-1.41)
Age 1.001 1.014*** 0.990 0.998 1.008* 1.001
(0.35) (3.07) (-1.40) (-0.47) (1.67) (0.11)
Board Size 0.913 0.963 0.970 0.974 0.932 1.023
(-1.57) (-0.44) (-0.39) (-0.43) (-0.99) (0.31)
% Insiders on Board 0.345 3.723 8.220 0.045** 6.341 0.644
(-1.18) (0.93) (1.68) (-2.43) (1.34) (-0.30)
% Board Appointed by CEO 0.298** 0.271 0.227** 0.297** 1.311 3.297
(-2.07) (-1.42) (-1.99) (-2.09) (0.38) (1.48)
Ave NED Tenure 0.825** 1.086 1.132 0.862** 1.067 1.055
(-2.34) (0.70) (1.28) (-2.15) (0.88) (0.62)
Block equity-CEO equity 1.020** 0.987 0.992 0.993* 1.021 1.016
(2.42) (-1.00) (-0.65) (-0.58) (1.64) (1.05)
Wald χ2 544.947(95)
Equality of coefficients: 101.84(30)
tenure< 5 & tenure> 5 (χ2)
1. T-statistics reported in the parentheses.
2. *** Significant at 1%. ** Significant at 5%. * Significant at 10%.
3. Year dummies included.
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remuneration committee reports etc. (Davies et al. 2008, p4) - and thereby encour-
aged participation at shareholder AGMs. This is reinforced by the increased role of
shareholder pressure groups and governance consultancies, such as Manifest, in pro-
viding alternative source of information to shareholders. However, above all it reflects
the view that the growth of institutional shareholdings challenges the received wis-
dom of the diffuse control of large public companies (Pensions Investment Research
Consultants 2003). Indeed work such as Leech(2001, 2003) suggests that effective vot-
ing control in many large UK companies could rest in the hands of a few fund managers
if they co-ordinate their voting. Furthermore, the large absolute size of these holdings
reduces their liquidity and thereby provides an incentive for intervention (Leech 2003).
Following the Myners’ Reports (2001, 2004) institutional shareholders’ organisations
have acknowledged the role of fund managers in corporate governance (Davies et al.
2008, p2).
Since changes in the governance environment have occurred progressively, but in-
crementally, over the period, we test for their impact by splitting our data at 2000
and labelling the sub-periods thereby created as ‘pre-reform’ and ‘post-reform’, respec-
tively. The results of this exercise are given as Table 7. We find supportive evidence
of an increase in the importance of firm performance post-reform. In particular, the
hazard of forced departure for the bottom quartile performers doubles between the two
sub-periods, with a corresponding fall in the other exit states. There is some suggestive
decline in the hazard for the top performing companies; although these changes are not
significant.
The results for our governance variables suggest a rather limited impact of the reform
process. Although the impact of insiders is weaker in the post reform period, the
entrenching effect of board members appointed by the CEO appears to have increased.
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Table 7: Impact of Governance reforms
Pre-Reform Post-Reform
Forced departure Retirement Other Forced departure Retirement Other
Total shareholder return
Lower quartile-Median 0.260*** 3.103** 3.220** 0.526** 1.735 1.605
(-2.78) (1.97) (2.09) (-2.19) (1.57) (1.20)
Median-Upper Quartile 0.389** 1.583 1.676 0.367*** 1.772 2.251**
(-2.26) (0.86) (0.99) (-3.22) (1.47) (1.94)
Upper Quartile 0.220*** 2.913* 1.081 0.181*** 3.423** 3.454**
(-3.19) (1.89) (0.12) (-3.94) (2.54) (2.45)
Ln Sales 1.274* 0.822 0.954 1.183* 0.959 0.812*
(1.82) (-1.23) (-0.29) (1.95) (-0.39) (-1.89)
Age 1.006** 1.002 0.993* 0.988** 1.019*** 1.007
(2.01) (0.69) (-1.80) (-2.11) (3.22) (1.11)
Board Size 0.976 0.970 0.976 0.899* 0.984 1.029
(-0.35) (-0.36) (-0.29) (-1.76) (-0.22) (0.37)
% Insiders on Board 0.096* 4.792 0.958 0.280 1.533 3.505
(-1.83) (1.02) (-0.03) (-1.29) (0.36) (0.94)
% Board Appointed by CEO 0.349** 2.769 0.574 0.114*** 2.787* 1.480
(-2.05) (1.23) (-0.85) (-4.13) (1.65) (0.61)
Ave NED Tenure 0.833** 1.139 1.121 0.769*** 1.209** 1.165
(-2.25) (1.43) (1.21) (-3.14) (2.10) (1.50)
Block equity-CEO equity 1.019 0.977 0.990 1.018** 1.020 1.007
(1.08) (-1.11) (-0.47) (2.31) (0.86) (0.29)
Wald χ2 488.997(89)
Equality of coefficients: 56.41(30)
Pre- and Post-reform (χ2)
1. Robust (clustered around CEO) t-statistics reported in the parentheses.
2. *** Significant at 1%. ** Significant at 5%. * Significant at 10%.
3. Year dummies included.
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However, again, neither of these differences are statistically significant. In sum, our
estimates cast doubt on the success of the reforms in weakening the ability of CEOs to
entrench themselves in their position.
3. Conclusions
We have presented evidence that the threat of CEO dismissal responds to performance
as measured by total shareholder return. We have also shown that the threat of dismissal
falls with certain structural measures of entrenchment such as the proportion of insiders
on the board or number of directors appointed during the CEO’s tenure. However, we
were unable to find a strong interaction between governance conditions and the impact
of performance in determining the threat of dismissal.
Our investigation has also exposed distinct differences between the hazard rates of
competing risk types and in the variation of these hazard rates over time. Whilst the risk
of retirement increases steadily throughout the CEO’s tenure, the risk of an exit under
pressure from the board and/or shareholders only increases to year four, after which
time a forced exit becomes decreasingly likely. Broadly speaking, such a result can be
interpreted in two ways. Either boards are placing increased trust in the competence
of CEOs who have survived until year four and therefore are more forgiving in light of
subsequent poor performance. Alternatively, and less optimistically, CEOs who survive
beyond year four are more capable of entrenching themselves in the position, perhaps
by filling the board with compliant directors who are less rigorous in their duty as
monitors of the CEO’s activity. Thus, the CEO is better able to resist punishment for
poor company performance in the later years of their tenure. Our results, favour the
latter explanation, as the composition of the board appears to be increasingly important
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as a predictor variable in the determination of the hazard rate in the later years of a
CEO’s tenure.
We also find a greater frequency of dismissals in the post 2000 period. This is per-
haps reflective of increased churn following the stock market downturn in 2001, but our
reported estimates also provide some support for the view that corporate governance
reforms have made it harder for CEOs to resist the consequences of poor share perfor-
mance. The post 2000 period is characterised by a higher ratio of outsider directors
on the board and the progressive reduction in average contract length has made CEO
service contracts cheaper to terminate. These changes, reflecting a succession of revi-
sions to the Combined Code, are suggestive of a positive role for policy in increasing the
incidence of performance related departures in UK business. However, the corporate
governance reforms appear to have been ineffective in reducing the ability of CEOs to
entrench themselves during their tenure. The threat of removal after year four continues
to recede at least as fast as it did before the implementation of most of the reforms.
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Appendix
Definition of exit events
Event Definition
Retirement Retirement (including early retirement, illness or death).
Headhunted CEO gave notice to immediately pursue a position at another company.
Change of Control The CEO exits the sample due to her Company being acquired,
wound up or taken private.
Ousted The CEO leaves under pressure from the Board or shareholders.
Dismissed The CEO is officially removed from their position either by
shareholders or the Board.
Interim Appointment The CEO resigns having been appointed only on a temporary
basis following a sudden departure.
Internal Position Change A positional change but the CEO effectively continues as CEO.
Retired to Part Time Position The CEO retires to become a non-executive director
or Chairman of the same company.
Unclassified The CEO exits the Company and there is no evidence to suggest
they had resigned under pressure.
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